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Całe szczęście, że nie używam kart Nvidia: http://nvidia.custhelp.com/app/answers/detail/a_id/4611/~/security-bulletin%3A-nvidia-gpu-display-driver-security-updates-for-speculative
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Problem z obsługą kerneli z kompresją LZ4 zgłoszony do autora skryptu.
Pracuje nad dodaniem obsługi.
Tymczasem samodzielnie poprawiłem skrypt.
Jest generalnie błąd w linii 379:
if ! which $3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then
Takie coś będzie dawać fałszywy wynik przy sprawdzaniu tego co podano w linii 409
try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop -d' lzop "$1" && return 0
Na razie skorygowałem sobie linie 379 i 405 - 409 oraz dopisałem dekompresję dla lz4.
Na chwilę się zawiesza, ale generalnie chyba działa jeśli chodzi o dekompresję.
Różnice:
#diff spectre-meltdown-checker.sh spectre-meltdown-checker_lz4.sh 11c11 < VERSION=0.23 --- > VERSION=0.23 mod_lz4_arecki 379c379 < if ! which $3 >/dev/null 2>&1; then --- > if ! which $4 >/dev/null 2>&1; then 406c406 < try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz xz-utils "$1" && return 0 --- > try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz unxz "$1" && return 0 408c408 < try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma xz-utils "$1" && return 0 --- > try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma unlzma "$1" && return 0 409a410 > try_decompress '\002\041\114\030' xyy 'lz4 -d -l' lz4 "$1" && return 0
Cały skorygowany skrypt:
#! /bin/sh # Spectre & Meltdown checker # # Check for the latest version at: # https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker # git clone https://github.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker.git # or wget https://raw.githubusercontent.com/speed47/spectre-meltdown-checker/master/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh # # Stephane Lesimple # VERSION=0.23 mod_lz4_arecki # Script configuration show_usage() { cat <<EOF Usage: Live mode: $0 [options] [--live] Offline mode: $0 [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>] Modes: Two modes are available. First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel. To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitely) Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel. You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, and if possible, the corresponding config and System.map files: --kernel vmlinux_file Specify a (possibly compressed) vmlinux file --config kernel_config Specify a kernel config file --map kernel_map_file Specify a kernel System.map file Options: --no-color Don't use color codes -v, --verbose Increase verbosity level --batch text Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone --batch nrpe Produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE --variant [1,2,3] Specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked Can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3) IMPORTANT: A false sense of security is worse than no security at all. Please use the --disclaimer option to understand exactly what this script does. EOF } show_disclaimer() { cat <<EOF Disclaimer: This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place. However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels). Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs. The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer explicitely stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement. This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security. EOF } # parse options opt_kernel='' opt_config='' opt_map='' opt_live_explicit=0 opt_live=1 opt_no_color=0 opt_batch=0 opt_batch_format="text" opt_verbose=1 opt_variant1=0 opt_variant2=0 opt_variant3=0 opt_allvariants=1 nrpe_critical=0 nrpe_unknown=0 nrpe_vuln="" __echo() { opt="$1" shift msg="$@" if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then # strip ANSI color codes msg=$(/bin/echo -e "$msg" | sed -r "s/\x1B\[([0-9]{1,2}(;[0-9]{1,2})?)?[m|K]//g") fi # explicitely call /bin/echo to avoid shell builtins that might not take options /bin/echo $opt -e "$msg" } _echo() { if [ $opt_verbose -ge $1 ]; then shift __echo '' "$@" fi } _echo_nol() { if [ $opt_verbose -ge $1 ]; then shift __echo -n "$@" fi } _warn() { _echo 0 "\033[31m${@}\033[0m" } _info() { _echo 1 "$@" } _info_nol() { _echo_nol 1 "$@" } _verbose() { _echo 2 "$@" } _debug() { _echo 3 "(debug) $@" } is_cpu_vulnerable() { # param: 1, 2 or 3 (variant) # returns 1 if vulnerable, 0 if not vulnerable, 255 on error # by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here. # usage: is_cpu_vulnerable 2 && do something if vulnerable variant1=0 variant2=0 variant3=0 if grep -q AMD /proc/cpuinfo; then variant1=0 variant2=1 variant3=1 elif grep -qi 'CPU implementer\s*:\s*0x41' /proc/cpuinfo; then # ARM # reference: https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update cpupart=$(awk '/CPU part/ {print $4;exit}' /proc/cpuinfo) cpuarch=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3;exit}' /proc/cpuinfo) if [ -n "$cpupart" -a -n "$cpuarch" ]; then # Cortex-R7 and Cortex-R8 are real-time and only used in medical devices or such # I can't find their CPU part number, but it's probably not that useful anyway # model R7 R8 A9 A15 A17 A57 A72 A73 A75 # part ? ? 0xc09 0xc0f 0xc0e 0xd07 0xd08 0xd09 0xd0a # arch 7? 7? 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 if [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(c09|c0f|c0e)$'; then # armv7 vulnerable chips variant1=0 variant2=0 elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(d07|d08|d09|d0a)$'; then # armv8 vulnerable chips variant1=0 variant2=0 else variant1=1 variant2=1 fi # for variant3, only A75 is vulnerable if [ "$cpuarch" = 8 -a "$cpupart" = 0xd0a ]; then variant3=0 else variant3=1 fi fi fi [ "$1" = 1 ] && return $variant1 [ "$1" = 2 ] && return $variant2 [ "$1" = 3 ] && return $variant3 return 255 } show_header() { _info "\033[1;34mSpectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION\033[0m" _info } parse_opt_file() { # parse_opt_file option_name option_value option_name="$1" option_value="$2" if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then show_header show_usage echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2 exit 1 elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then show_header echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2 exit 1 elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then show_header echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2 exit 1 elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then show_header echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2 exit 1 fi echo "$option_value" exit 0 } while [ -n "$1" ]; do if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2") [ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $? shift 2 opt_live=0 elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2") [ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $? shift 2 opt_live=0 elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2") [ $? -ne 0 ] && exit $? shift 2 opt_live=0 elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then opt_live_explicit=1 shift elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then opt_no_color=1 shift elif [ "$1" = "--batch" ]; then opt_batch=1 opt_verbose=0 shift case "$1" in text|nrpe) opt_batch_format="$1"; shift;; --*) ;; # allow subsequent flags '') ;; # allow nothing at all *) echo "$0: error: unknown batch format '$1'" echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, nrpe" exit 1 >&2 ;; esac elif [ "$1" = "-v" -o "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then opt_verbose=$(expr $opt_verbose + 1) shift elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then if [ -z "$2" ]; then echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2 or 3)" >&2 exit 1 fi case "$2" in 1) opt_variant1=1; opt_allvariants=0;; 2) opt_variant2=1; opt_allvariants=0;; 3) opt_variant3=1; opt_allvariants=0;; *) echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2 or 3" >&2; exit 1;; esac shift 2 elif [ "$1" = "-h" -o "$1" = "--help" ]; then show_header show_usage exit 0 elif [ "$1" = "--disclaimer" ]; then show_header show_disclaimer exit 0 else show_header show_usage echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'" exit 1 fi done show_header # print status function pstatus() { if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ]; then _info_nol "$2" else case "$1" in red) col="\033[101m\033[30m";; green) col="\033[102m\033[30m";; yellow) col="\033[103m\033[30m";; blue) col="\033[104m\033[30m";; *) col="";; esac _info_nol "$col $2 \033[0m" fi [ -n "$3" ] && _info_nol " ($3)" _info } # Print the final status of a vulnerability (incl. batch mode) # Arguments are: CVE UNK/OK/VULN description pvulnstatus() { if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ]; then case "$opt_batch_format" in text) _echo 0 "$1: $2 ($3)";; nrpe) case "$2" in UKN) nrpe_unknown="1";; VULN) nrpe_critical="1"; nrpe_vuln="$nrpe_vuln $1";; esac ;; esac fi _info_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m " vulnstatus="$2" shift 2 case "$vulnstatus" in UNK) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$@";; VULN) pstatus red 'VULNERABLE' "$@";; OK) pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' "$@";; esac } # The 3 below functions are taken from the extract-linux script, available here: # https://github.com/torvalds/linux/blob/master/scripts/extract-vmlinux # The functions have been modified for better integration to this script # The original header of the file has been retained below # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- # extract-vmlinux - Extract uncompressed vmlinux from a kernel image # # Inspired from extract-ikconfig # (c) 2009,2010 Dick Streefland <dick@streefland.net> # # (c) 2011 Corentin Chary <corentin.chary@gmail.com> # # Licensed under the GNU General Public License, version 2 (GPLv2). # ---------------------------------------------------------------------- vmlinux='' vmlinux_err='' check_vmlinux() { readelf -h $1 > /dev/null 2>&1 || return 1 return 0 } try_decompress() { # The obscure use of the "tr" filter is to work around older versions of # "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern. # Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here for pos in `tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$5" | grep -abo "^$2"` do if ! which $4 >/dev/null 2>&1; then vmlinux_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$4' package" return 0 fi pos=${pos%%:*} tail -c+$pos "$5" | $3 > $vmlinuxtmp 2> /dev/null check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp" && vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp && return 0 done return 1 } extract_vmlinux() { [ -n "$1" ] || return 1 # Prepare temp files: vmlinuxtmp="$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXXXXX)" trap "rm -f $vmlinuxtmp" EXIT # Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects: if check_vmlinux "$1"; then cat "$1" > "$vmlinuxtmp" vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp return 0 fi # That didn't work, so retry after decompression. try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip gunzip "$1" && return 0 try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz unxz "$1" && return 0 try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 bzip2 "$1" && return 0 try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma unlzma "$1" && return 0 try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop -d' lzop "$1" && return 0 try_decompress '\002\041\114\030' xyy 'lz4 -d -l' lz4 "$1" && return 0 return 1 } # end of extract-vmlinux functions # check for mode selection inconsistency if [ "$opt_live_explicit" = 1 ]; then if [ -n "$opt_kernel" -o -n "$opt_config" -o -n "$opt_map" ]; then show_usage echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, use either --live or --kernel/--config/--map" exit 1 fi fi # root check (only for live mode, for offline mode, we already checked if we could read the files) if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then _warn "Note that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information." _warn "We'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors." _warn "To run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0" _warn fi _info "Checking for vulnerabilities against live running kernel \033[35m"$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)"\033[0m" # try to find the image of the current running kernel # first, look for the BOOT_IMAGE hint in the kernel cmdline if [ -r /proc/cmdline ] && grep -q 'BOOT_IMAGE=' /proc/cmdline; then opt_kernel=$(grep -Eo 'BOOT_IMAGE=[^ ]+' /proc/cmdline | cut -d= -f2) _debug "found opt_kernel=$opt_kernel in /proc/cmdline" # if we have a dedicated /boot partition, our bootloader might have just called it / # so try to prepend /boot and see if we find anything [ -e "/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$opt_kernel" _debug "opt_kernel is now $opt_kernel" # else, the full path is already there (most probably /boot/something) fi # if we didn't find a kernel, default to guessing if [ ! -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then [ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux [ -e /boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre [ -e /boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r) [ -e /boot/kernel-$( uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-$( uname -r) [ -e /boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r) [ -e /boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r) ] && opt_kernel=/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r) fi # system.map if [ -e /proc/kallsyms ] ; then opt_map="/proc/kallsyms" elif [ -e /boot/System.map-$(uname -r) ] ; then opt_map=/boot/System.map-$(uname -r) fi # config if [ -e /proc/config.gz ] ; then dumped_config="$(mktemp /tmp/config-XXXXXX)" gunzip -c /proc/config.gz > $dumped_config # dumped_config will be deleted at the end of the script opt_config=$dumped_config elif [ -e /boot/config-$(uname -r) ]; then opt_config=/boot/config-$(uname -r) fi else _info "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel" fi if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then _verbose "Will use vmlinux image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m" else _verbose "Will use no vmlinux image (accuracy might be reduced)" fi if [ -n "$dumped_config" ]; then _verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m/proc/config.gz\033[0m" elif [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then _verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m" else _verbose "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)" fi if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then _verbose "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m" else _verbose "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)" fi if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then if ! which readelf >/dev/null 2>&1; then vmlinux_err="missing 'readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package" else extract_vmlinux "$opt_kernel" fi else vmlinux_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal" fi if [ -z "$vmlinux" -o ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then [ -z "$vmlinux_err" ] && vmlinux_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel" fi _info # end of header stuff # now we define some util functions and the check_*() funcs, as # the user can choose to execute only some of those mount_debugfs() { if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then # try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1 fi } umount_debugfs() { if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then # umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves umount /sys/kernel/debug fi } ################### # SPECTRE VARIANT 1 check_variant1() { _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m" _info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: " status=0 if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err" else if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" else # here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode # in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50 # in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+) # v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches, # so let's push the threshold to 70. # TODO LKML patch is starting to dump LFENCE in favor of the PAUSE opcode, we might need to check that (patch not stabilized yet) nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence) if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70" status=1 else pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70" status=2 fi fi fi if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" else case "$status" in 0) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 UNK "impossible to check ${vmlinux}";; 1) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 VULN 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';; 2) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';; esac fi } ################### # SPECTRE VARIANT 2 check_variant2() { _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m" _info "* Mitigation 1" _info_nol "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: " if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then # try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards) modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1 fi if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" else # the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48 # here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool # if we get a read error, the MSR is not there dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then pstatus green YES else pstatus red NO fi fi if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then # if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module rmmod msr 2>/dev/null fi _info_nol "* Kernel support for IBRS: " if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then mount_debugfs if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then # if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in pstatus green YES ibrs_supported=1 ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then # RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301) pstatus green YES ibrs_supported=1 ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) fi fi if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then pstatus green YES ibrs_supported=1 fi fi if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then pstatus red NO fi _info_nol "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: " if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then # 0 means disabled # 1 is enabled only for kernel space # 2 is enabled for kernel and user space case "$ibrs_enabled" in "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; 0) pstatus red NO;; 1 | 2) pstatus green YES;; *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; esac else pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" fi _info_nol "* IBRS enabled for User space: " if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then case "$ibrs_enabled" in "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; 0 | 1) pstatus red NO;; 2) pstatus green YES;; *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; esac else pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" fi _info "* Mitigation 2" _info_nol "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: " # We check the RETPOLINE kernel options if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then pstatus green YES retpoline=1 else pstatus red NO fi else pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration" fi _info_nol "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: " # Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm # For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles) # See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79 # In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set # *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then # look for the symbol if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then retpoline_compiler=1 pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map" else pstatus red NO fi elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then # look for the symbol if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then # the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then retpoline_compiler=1 pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols" else pstatus red NO fi elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then # if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have # any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary retpoline_compiler=1 pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux" else pstatus red NO fi else pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map" fi if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability" elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability" else pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" fi else if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime" else pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" fi fi } ######################## # MELTDOWN aka VARIANT 3 check_variant3() { _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m" _info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): " kpti_support=0 kpti_can_tell=0 if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then kpti_can_tell=1 if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then kpti_support=1 fi fi if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then # it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch # so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map kpti_can_tell=1 if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then kpti_support=1 fi fi if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then # same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the # nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option) kpti_can_tell=1 if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" else if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then kpti_support=1 fi fi fi if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then pstatus green YES elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then pstatus red NO else pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file" fi mount_debugfs _info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: " if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then # vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo kpti_enabled=1 elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then # kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo kpti_enabled=1 elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then # RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301 kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null) elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then # if we can't find the flag, grep dmesg output kpti_enabled=1 elif [ -r /var/log/dmesg ] && grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled' /var/log/dmesg; then # if we can't find the flag in dmesg output, grep in /var/log/dmesg when readable kpti_enabled=1 else kpti_enabled=0 fi if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then pstatus green YES else pstatus red NO fi else pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode" fi if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability" else pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" fi else if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime" else pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" fi fi } # now run the checks the user asked for if [ "$opt_variant1" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then check_variant1 _info fi if [ "$opt_variant2" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then check_variant2 _info fi if [ "$opt_variant3" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then check_variant3 _info fi _info "A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer" # this'll umount only if we mounted debugfs ourselves umount_debugfs # cleanup the temp decompressed config [ -n "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config" if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 -a "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then if [ ! -z "$nrpe_vuln" ]; then echo "Vulnerable:$nrpe_vuln" else echo "OK" fi [ "$nrpe_critical" = 1 ] && exit 2 # critical [ "$nrpe_unknown" = 1 ] && exit 3 # unknown exit 0 # ok fi
Autor dodał już wparcie dla LZ4, zawiesza się podobnie jak przy moich modyfikacjach, ale to podobno normalne.
Ostatnio edytowany przez arecki (2018-01-10 20:32:33)
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Najnowsze mikrokody Intela są już w Debianie.
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@Renia czy masz na mysli tą wersję? Bo innej mi nie wykrywa obecnie ;-) 3.20170707.1~deb8u1
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@KerneLpaniC:
3.20180108.1 — jest w sidzie i testingu. Do stable też pewnie niebawem trafi.
A do muzealnych wydań, może w ogóle nie trafić. Szczególnie widząc obecną u ciebie wersję (już dawno nieaktualizowana).
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ale przecież oldstable to nadal stable ;(
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Może czas pomyśleć o aktualizacji systemu do nowszego wydania?
Im starsze wydanie, tym wsparcie słabsze. Do tego architektura 32-bit — to też już od dawna jest słabiej wspierane.
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znalazłem intel-microcode dla mojego procka https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/27431/Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-File?product=34445
czy mogę zaktualizować ręcznie? bedzie to bezpieczne? mogą być problemy ? to plik dla linuxa 8
sudo cp -r ~/Pobrane/microcode-*/intel-ucode /lib/firmware/
sudo -i && echo 1 > /sys/devices/system/cpu/microcode/reload
wszystko dla linuksowych os https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/27431/Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-File
/ edit pliki zaktualizowane, właściwie chyba podmienione, wszystko śmiga ale vulnerable i tak jest ;p
Ostatnio edytowany przez KerneLpaniC (2018-01-12 19:25:33)
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Nawet staruszek Wheezy ma jeszcze wsparcie do maja 2018 roku i paczki są w dla niego aktualizowane więc pewnie i firmware Intela trafi niebawem. Oczywiście można wrzucić mikrokody ręcznie albo pobrać paczkę z choćby z dystrybucji MX 15 lub Ubuntu Xenial i zainstalować w starszym Debianie.
Edit:[quote=KerneLpaniC]pliki zaktualizowane, właściwie chyba podmienione, wszystko śmiga ale vulnerable i tak jest ;p[/quote]
A czego się spodziewałeś? Aktualizacja mikrokodów to mały kroczek, a kerneli odpornych na przypadłość Spectre jeszcze nie ma. Tylko Red Hat, CentOS coś tam łatają na własną rękę, a reszta czeka, aż kernel sam się zrobi i wtedy włączą go do dystrybucji.
Ostatnio edytowany przez Renia (2018-01-13 15:21:49)
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[quote=Renia]Nawet staruszek Wheezy ma jeszcze wsparcie do maja 2018 roku i paczki są w dla niego aktualizowane więc pewnie i firmware Intela trafi niebawem. Oczywiście można wrzucić mikrokody ręcznie albo pobrać paczkę z choćby z dystrybucji MX 15 lub Ubuntu Xenial i zainstalować w starszym Debianie.
Edit:[quote=KerneLpaniC]pliki zaktualizowane, właściwie chyba podmienione, wszystko śmiga ale vulnerable i tak jest ;p[/quote]
A czego się spodziewałeś? Aktualizacja mikrokodów to mały kroczek, a kerneli odpornych na przypadłość Spectre jeszcze nie ma. Tylko Red Hat, CentOS coś tam łatają na własną rękę, a reszta czeka, aż kernel sam się zrobi i wtedy włączą go do dystrybucji.[/quote]
Wszyscy łatają jednakowo, Red-hat tylko wydaje miliardy na PR, żeby udawać mega-pro.
Krytyczne błędy najszybciej są łatane w Debianie, nie w RH, żeby wspomnieć np LD_AUDIT czy Ghost (oba w bibliotece gnu-libc6).
A np mój Gentuś?
qlist -ICv microcode sys-apps/microcode-ctl-1.28-r2 sys-firmware/intel-microcode-20180108
# G1 ### sob sty 13 16:50:11 domek : ~ root ~> /usr/sbin/microcode_ctl -u /usr/sbin/microcode_ctl: writing microcode (length: 1613824) /usr/sbin/microcode_ctl: microcode successfuly written to /dev/cpu/microcode
SOA#1
To by było na tyle
Ostatnio edytowany przez Jacekalex (2018-01-13 17:03:46)
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@Jacekalex
Pisałam pod kątem łatania kernela na Spectre, bo wrzucić same mikrokody do każdej dystrybucji to nie taki duży problem skoro już są na oficjalnej stronie Intela.
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[quote=Renia]@Jacekalex
Pisałam pod kątem łatania kernela na Spectre, bo wrzucić same mikrokody do każdej dystrybucji to nie taki duży problem skoro już są na oficjalnej stronie Intela.[/quote]
Ja natomiast pisałem pod kątem 11 letniego doświadczenia z Linuxem.
Spectre czy Meltdown są na tyle trudne ataku zdalnego, ze nie ma paniki, jeśli coś trwa kilka dni.
Pamiętam kilka podatności, przy których obecne problemy wyglądają dosyć trywialnie (żeby wspomnieć np Heartbleed czy Ghost).
Ostatnio edytowany przez Jacekalex (2018-01-13 20:48:23)
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Przeniosłem sie na stretcha i juz jestem odporny na meltdown ;-)
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[quote=Renia]Nawet staruszek Wheezy ma jeszcze wsparcie do maja 2018 roku i paczki są w dla niego aktualizowane[/quote]
To tylko częściowe i nieoficjalne wsparcie, które nie ma nic wspólnego z aktualizacjami bezpieczeństwa Debiana — tymi oficjalnymi. Chwała za to tym wszystkim ochotnikom, ale to tylko prowizorka.
więc pewnie i firmware Intela trafi niebawem.[/quote]
To też można między bajki włożyć.
Aktualizowane jest tylko w Backportach stable i to z pewnym opóźnieniem.
A w innych dystrybucjach nie ma takiej sraczki jak w RH (zresztą to tylko PR) bo, poza całym tym medialnym szumem, te błędy nie są tak łatwe do wykorzystania jak i do połatania.
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Pozwolę sobie mieć inne zdanie w tej kwestii.
Nawet UBUNTU wzięło sobie do serca łatanie starszych kerneli: https://insights.ubuntu.com/2018/01/17/spectre-mitigation-updates-available-for-testing-in-ubuntu-proposed/
Ostatnio edytowany przez Renia (2018-01-24 15:43:26)
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coś powolutku się dzieje, nvidia załatana
https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-5715
intel sie wycofał ze swojego microcode z 2018r na stronie do pobrania znowu stary z 2017 https://downloadcenter.intel.com/download/27337/Linux-Processor-Microcode-Data-File?v=t
Ostatnio edytowany przez KerneLpaniC (2018-01-24 17:01:48)
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[quote=13.01.2018 Red Hat]Red Hat has made updated kernels available to address these security vulnerabilities. [b]These patches are enabled by default (detailed below), because Red Hat prioritizes out of the box security.[/b][/quote]
https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301
Tymczasem:
[quote=21.01.2018 Linus Torvalds]As it is, the patches are COMPLETE AND UTTER GARBAGE.[/quote]
https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/22/598
I tylko spuścił po nich wodę:
And I really don't want to see these garbage patches just mindlessly sent around.
Linus[/quote]
https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/1/21/201
@KerneLpaniC:
Te wszystkie dotychczasowe kroki Intela odpowiednio podsumował Linus.
To firmware mogło być tego samego kalibru i może dlatego je Intel wycofał.
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[url=http://www.komputerswiat.pl/nowosci/bezpieczenstwo/2018/04/intel-odradza-instalowanie-patchy-dla-spectre-i-meltdown.aspx]Intel odradza instalowanie patchy dla Spectre i Meltdown[/url]
Brak źródła informacji.
Intel obecnie prosi partnerów o wstrzymanie dystrybucji starszych poprawek dla Spectre. Te po prostu są feralne i powodują liczne problemy. Dlatego nie powinno się ich instalować. Po wdrożeniu patchy urządzenia częściej się restartują, a systemy operacyjne tracą na stabilności.[/quote]
Poza tym link do opisu na temat tego co Linus twierdzi o patchach Intela (niestety brukowiec również zapomniał o źródłach) http://www.komputerswiat.pl/nowosci/bezpieczenstwo/2018/04/tworca-linuksa-linus-torvalds-o-patchach-intela-na-spectre-i-meltdown-to-smieci.aspxTorvalds twierdzi, że patche dostarczone przez Intela są zwykłymi śmieciami. Poprawki generują duży narzut wydajnościowy i ojciec Linuksa uważa, że wprowadzenie aktualizacji powoduje wykonywanie operacji, które nie mają sensu. Nie ma nawet pewności, że te zapewniają odpowiednią ochronę kernela, co miało być ich głównym przeznaczeniem.[/quote]
Ostatnio edytowany przez arecki (2018-01-24 18:22:31)
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Przetestowałam sobie trochę ten załatany kernel od Ubuntu i zawiesza komputer po pewnym czasie, być może coś jest na rzeczy. Czekam na nowe GGC, żeby skompilować nowy kernel z Reptoline.
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U mnie te samoistne restarty Windy doprowadziły do konieczności skorzystania z
chkdsk /r
Jeszcze taka ciekawostka
"Intel najpierw ostrzegł Chiny o lukach Meltdown i Spectre"
https://www.purepc.pl/procesory/intel_najpierw_ostrzegl_chiny_o_lukach_meltdown_i_spectre
Ostatnio edytowany przez ciastek1981 (2018-01-30 15:07:11)
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Pytanie choć wiem że nikt nie jest jasnowidzem. Możliwe że reptoline wejdzie do security update dla stretcha?
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Szybciej swój kernel zrobić. Ja nie czekałam tylko zainstalowałam aktualne GCC 7.3.0 i wzięłam świeżutki kernel 4.15, oto wynik:
./spectre-meltdown-checker.sh
Spectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v0.33+
Checking for vulnerabilities on current system
Kernel is Linux 4.15.0-gcc-patch-unsigned-security #1 SMP PREEMPT Tue Jan 30 00:40:32 CET 2018 x86_64
CPU is Intel(R) Celeron(R) CPU 2.80GHz
Hardware check
* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques
* Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)
* SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: NO
* CPU indicates IBRS capability: NO
* Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)
* PRED_CMD MSR is available: NO
* CPU indicates IBPB capability: NO
* Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)
* SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: NO
* CPU indicates STIBP capability: NO
* Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)
* CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: NO
* ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: NO
* CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO): NO
* CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: NO
* CPU vulnerability to the three speculative execution attacks variants
* Vulnerable to Variant 1: YES
* Vulnerable to Variant 2: YES
* Vulnerable to Variant 3: YES
CVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: NO (kernel confirms your system is vulnerable)
[u]> STATUS: VULNERABLE (Vulnerable)[/u]
CVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (kernel confirms that the mitigation is active)
* Mitigation 1
* Kernel is compiled with IBRS/IBPB support: NO
* Currently enabled features
* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: NO
* IBRS enabled for User space: NO
* IBPB enabled: NO
* Mitigation 2
* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: YES
* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: YES (kernel reports full retpoline compilation)
* Retpoline enabled: YES
[b]> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: Full generic retpoline)[/b]
CVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'
* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: YES (kernel confirms that the mitigation is active)
* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): YES
* PTI enabled and active: YES
* Running as a Xen PV DomU: NO
[b]> STATUS: NOT VULNERABLE (Mitigation: PTI)[/b]
A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer[/quote]Kod:
./a.out Putting 'The Magic Words are Squeamish Ossifrage.' in memory, address 0x55f822918e38 Reading 40 bytes: Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedb8... Success: 0x54='T' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedb9... Success: 0x68='h' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedba... Success: 0x65='e' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedbb... Success: 0x20=' ' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedbc... Success: 0x4D='M' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedbd... Success: 0x61='a' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedbe... Success: 0x67='g' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedbf... Success: 0x69='i' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedc0... Success: 0x63='c' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedc1... Success: 0x20=' ' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedc2... Success: 0x57='W' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedc3... Success: 0x6F='o' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedc4... Success: 0x72='r' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedc5... Success: 0x64='d' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedc6... Success: 0x73='s' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedc7... Success: 0x20=' ' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedc8... Success: 0x61='a' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedc9... Success: 0x72='r' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedca... Success: 0x65='e' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedcb... Success: 0x20=' ' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedcc... Success: 0x53='S' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedcd... Success: 0x71='q' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedce... Success: 0x75='u' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedcf... Success: 0x65='e' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedd0... Success: 0x61='a' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedd1... Success: 0x6D='m' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedd2... Success: 0x69='i' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedd3... Success: 0x73='s' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedd4... Success: 0x68='h' score=7 (second best: 0x05='?' score=1) Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedd5... Success: 0x20=' ' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedd6... Success: 0x4F='O' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedd7... Success: 0x73='s' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedd8... Success: 0x73='s' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedd9... Success: 0x69='i' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedda... Success: 0x66='f' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfeddb... Success: 0x72='r' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfeddc... Success: 0x61='a' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfeddd... Success: 0x67='g' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfedde... Success: 0x65='e' score=2 Reading at malicious_x = 0xffffffffffdfeddf... Success: 0x2E='.' score=2Edit:
Kod:
./spectre CACHE_HIT_THRESHOLD = 80 MAX_TRIES = 2500 Size of secret is 41 Size of recovered_secret is 41 Original secret: 'The Magic Words are Squeamish Ossifrage.' Recovered secret: '' Reading 40 bytes: Reading at malicious_x = 0xa0... Unclear: 0x54=’T’ score=2500 (’T|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xa1... Unclear: 0x68=’h’ score=2500 (’h|[’ second: 0x5B=’[’ score=2500) Reading at malicious_x = 0xa2... Unclear: 0x65=’e’ score=2500 (’e|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xa3... Unclear: 0x20=’ ’ score=2500 (’ |?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2498) Reading at malicious_x = 0xa4... Unclear: 0x4D=’M’ score=2500 (’M|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xa5... Unclear: 0x61=’a’ score=2500 (’a|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xa6... Unclear: 0x67=’g’ score=2500 (’g|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xa7... Unclear: 0x69=’i’ score=2500 (’i|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2498) Reading at malicious_x = 0xa8... Unclear: 0x63=’c’ score=2499 (’?|c’ first: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xa9... Unclear: 0x20=’ ’ score=2500 (’ |?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2498) Reading at malicious_x = 0xaa... Unclear: 0x57=’W’ score=2500 (’W|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xab... Unclear: 0x6F=’o’ score=2500 (’o|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xac... Unclear: 0x72=’r’ score=2500 (’r|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xad... Unclear: 0x64=’d’ score=2500 (’d|[’ second: 0x5B=’[’ score=2500) Reading at malicious_x = 0xae... Unclear: 0x73=’s’ score=2500 (’s|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xaf... Unclear: 0x20=’ ’ score=2500 (’ |?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xb0... Unclear: 0x61=’a’ score=2500 (’a|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xb1... Unclear: 0x72=’r’ score=2500 (’r|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xb2... Unclear: 0x65=’e’ score=2499 (’?|e’ first: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xb3... Unclear: 0x20=’ ’ score=2500 (’ |?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2498) Reading at malicious_x = 0xb4... Unclear: 0x5B=’[’ score=2500 (’[|S’ second: 0x53=’S’ score=2500) Reading at malicious_x = 0xb5... Unclear: 0x71=’q’ score=2500 (’q|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xb6... Unclear: 0x75=’u’ score=2500 (’u|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xb7... Unclear: 0x65=’e’ score=2500 (’e|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xb8... Unclear: 0x61=’a’ score=2500 (’a|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xb9... Unclear: 0x6D=’m’ score=2500 (’m|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xba... Unclear: 0x69=’i’ score=2500 (’i|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xbb... Unclear: 0x73=’s’ score=2500 (’s|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xbc... Unclear: 0x68=’h’ score=2500 (’h|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xbd... Unclear: 0x20=’ ’ score=2500 (’ |?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xbe... Unclear: 0x4F=’O’ score=2500 (’O|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xbf... Unclear: 0x73=’s’ score=2500 (’s|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2498) Reading at malicious_x = 0xc0... Unclear: 0x73=’s’ score=2500 (’s|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xc1... Unclear: 0x69=’i’ score=2500 (’i|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xc2... Unclear: 0x66=’f’ score=2500 (’f|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xc3... Unclear: 0x72=’r’ score=2500 (’r|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xc4... Unclear: 0x61=’a’ score=2500 (’a|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xc5... Unclear: 0x67=’g’ score=2500 (’g|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xc6... Unclear: 0x65=’e’ score=2500 (’e|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) Reading at malicious_x = 0xc7... Unclear: 0x2E=’.’ score=2500 (’.|?’ second: 0x00=’?’ score=2501) counter thread finished Original secret: 'The Magic Words are Squeamish Ossifrage.' Recovered secret: 'The Magic Words are [queamish Ossifrage.'Ostatnio edytowany przez Renia (2018-01-30 18:03:39)
Instalacja E-Deklaracje na Debianie 64-bit:
https://forum.dug.net.pl/viewtopic.php?pid=301794#p301794
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Bardzo ładnie @Renia . Ja nigdy sam nie kompilowałem. Miałaś jakieś problemy?
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Time (s) | Query |
---|---|
0.00014 | SET CHARSET latin2 |
0.00004 | SET NAMES latin2 |
0.00134 | SELECT u.*, g.*, o.logged FROM punbb_users AS u INNER JOIN punbb_groups AS g ON u.group_id=g.g_id LEFT JOIN punbb_online AS o ON o.ident='3.145.176.228' WHERE u.id=1 |
0.00246 | REPLACE INTO punbb_online (user_id, ident, logged) VALUES(1, '3.145.176.228', 1732278996) |
0.00056 | SELECT * FROM punbb_online WHERE logged<1732278696 |
0.00361 | DELETE FROM punbb_online WHERE ident='85.208.96.196' |
0.00075 | SELECT topic_id FROM punbb_posts WHERE id=317221 |
0.00013 | SELECT id FROM punbb_posts WHERE topic_id=30168 ORDER BY posted |
0.00091 | SELECT t.subject, t.closed, t.num_replies, t.sticky, f.id AS forum_id, f.forum_name, f.moderators, fp.post_replies, 0 FROM punbb_topics AS t INNER JOIN punbb_forums AS f ON f.id=t.forum_id LEFT JOIN punbb_forum_perms AS fp ON (fp.forum_id=f.id AND fp.group_id=3) WHERE (fp.read_forum IS NULL OR fp.read_forum=1) AND t.id=30168 AND t.moved_to IS NULL |
0.00027 | SELECT search_for, replace_with FROM punbb_censoring |
0.01865 | SELECT u.email, u.title, u.url, u.location, u.use_avatar, u.signature, u.email_setting, u.num_posts, u.registered, u.admin_note, p.id, p.poster AS username, p.poster_id, p.poster_ip, p.poster_email, p.message, p.hide_smilies, p.posted, p.edited, p.edited_by, g.g_id, g.g_user_title, o.user_id AS is_online FROM punbb_posts AS p INNER JOIN punbb_users AS u ON u.id=p.poster_id INNER JOIN punbb_groups AS g ON g.g_id=u.group_id LEFT JOIN punbb_online AS o ON (o.user_id=u.id AND o.user_id!=1 AND o.idle=0) WHERE p.topic_id=30168 ORDER BY p.id LIMIT 125,25 |
0.00087 | UPDATE punbb_topics SET num_views=num_views+1 WHERE id=30168 |
Total query time: 0.02973 s |